The Dueling First Amendments: Government as Funder and the
Establishment Clause1
Carol Nackenoff
Swarthmore College
Cnacken1@swarthmore.edu
The public events and public speeches respondents call in question are part of the open
discussion essential to democratic self‐government. The Executive Branch should be free,
as a general matter, to discover new ideas, to understand pressing public demands, and
to find creative responses to address governmental concerns. The exchange of ideas
between and among the State and Federal Governments and their manifold, diverse
constituencies sustains a free society.
Kennedy, J. concurring in Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Foundation2

Posing the question of standing in Hein as an issue of interfering with dialogue and with the free
exchange of ideas and information between the federal government—here, the Executive Branch—and
its constituencies, Justice Kennedy provides the fifth vote to deny standing to members of the Freedom
from Religion Foundation in the 2007 Hein case. That the Freedom from Religion Foundation could not
bring their Establishment Clause challenge before the Court, we now know. What more we know from
Hein is quite uncertain—as is the fate of taxpayer challenges to the use of public funds in support of
religion.
In Hein, Justice Kennedy both joined the opinion of Justice Alito (in which Roberts, C.J. also
joined) and wrote his own additional concurrence. At the same time, he did not join the concurrence in
denial of standing penned by Justice Scalia (with Justice Thomas), arguing that Flast should be
overturned. Seven justices held that Flast, properly understood, remained good constitutional law; four
of these believed that Freedom from Religion Foundation should have been granted standing under
Flast (the dissenters: Souter, J. with whom Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined). But six
justices (the four dissenters plus Justices Scalia and Thomas) could find no distinction between the Hein
challenge to Executive Branch expenditure and specific acts passed by Congress under the spending
clause. Justice Scalia said he (and Justice Thomas) joined the bewilderment of the dissenters as to “why
the plurality fixates on the amount of additional discretion the Executive Branch enjoys under the law
beyond the only discretion relevant to the Establishment Clause issue: whether to spend taxpayer funds
for a purpose that is unconstitutional.”3 Scalia rejects the express allocation line of argument made by
his colleagues denying standing:
The plurality would deny standing to a taxpayer challenging the President’s disbursement
to a religious organization of a discrete appropriation that Congress had not explicitly
allocated to that purpose, even if everyone knew that Congress and the President had
informally negotiated that the entire sum would be spent in that precise manner. See
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ante, at 17, n. 7 (holding that nonstatutory earmarks are insufficient to satisfy the
express‐allocation requirement).4

For Scalia, the “psychic injury” approach to standing for purported Establishment Clause
violations is nonsense, and this is how he characterizes the Flast approach. The danger, Scalia argues, is
“a future in which ideologically motivated taxpayers could ‘roam the country in search of governmental
wrongdoing and . . . reveal their discoveries in federal court,’ transforming those courts into
‘ombudsmen of the general welfare’ with respect to Establishment Clause issues.”5 Notice that the
focus on taxpaper’s “purely psychological displeasure that his funds are being spent in an allegedly
unlawful manner,” not only lacks the concreteness of a “wallet injury” but that it constitutes an
ideological motivation and a viewpoint? There is no judicially cognizable injury: only disagreements
about policy. For Justice Souter and the dissenters, however, the “’injury’ alleged in Establishment
Clause challenges to federal spending” is “the very ‘extract[ion] and spen[ding]’ of ‘tax money’ in the aid
of religion.”6 For the dissenters, claims about the violation of the Establishment Clause occasioned by
government spending decisions are not mere ideas. It is about more than raised hackles of
disagreement about the policy supported.7 If taxpayer money in identifiable amounts is funding
conferences that promote religion, there is an identifiable injury—even if the amount of an individual
taxpayer’s tax going to this purpose is miniscule.
With the Court in disarray over the proper approach to taxpayer standing under the
Establishment Clause, the day may not be far off if Justice Kennedy’s approach to Hein, with its
emphasis on ideas, comes to prevail. I maintain that the Court’s posture on a specific line of freedom of
speech cases helps us understand—and even predict‐‐the fate of recent Establishment Clause
challenges. It seems as if the implicit, though not explicit, convergence of these First Amendment
trajectories, combined with Hein’s reading of Establishment Clause standing requirements, could
provide the Executive Branch—and even Congress‐‐with nearly unassailable opportunities to rewrite the
boundaries of church‐state relations.
While Justice Kennedy cautioned that federal officials must make a conscious effort to obey the
Constitution even when their activities cannot be challenged in a court of law, he was more concerned
with the alternate scenario had standing been granted: the possibility that the “courts would soon
assume the role of speech editors for communications issued by executive officials and event planners
for the meetings they hold.” 8 Accepting too broad a view of standing, then, would entangle the Court in
oversight in areas in which the other branches of government should have wide discretion.
Treating the activities of the White House Office of Faith‐Based and Community Initiatives as
government speech9 puts a different cast on already difficult Establishment Clause challenges to
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governmental expenditures. And Kennedy’s approach resonates with a set of First Amendment
precedents involving government as funder—precedents that Justices Scalia and Thomas have already
embraced and that might readily attract Justices Roberts and Alito.
The government‐funded conferences and workshops providing grant‐writing tutorials that were
at issue in Hein were designed for faith‐based groups, so that they could better access federal funds.
They were funded by executive branch appropriations, pursuant to President Bush’s Executive Order
establishing the White House Office of Faith‐Based and Community Initiatives. The purpose of the
Office was to use federal funding to “expand the role” and “increase capacity” of religious organizations,
coordinating a national effort to expand opportunities for these kinds of groups; efforts led to increased
numbers of government grants to religious organizations.10
Standing for many Establishment Clause challenges is difficult to obtain because the purported
injuries are often broadly distributed. Flast , permitting taxpayer standing for an Establishment Clause
challenge to a federal statute providing aid to religious schools, has certainly been limited by more
recent Court decisions, as Justice Scalia notes approvingly.11 It had been reread as limited only to
government action under the congressional taxing and spending clause by 1982.12 And standing has
been further circumscribed by Justice Scalia’s own opinion in Lujan, a case involving standing under the
Endangered Species Act. Here, despite protests from Justices Blackmun and O’Connor that the majority
is waging a “slash‐and‐burn expedition through the law of environmental standing,” Scalia strongly
suggests that the barriers to standing based on Article III’s case or controversy language, requiring
perceptible injury (injury in fact) cannot be overcome by congressional citizen suit provisions—that is,
only those citizens who can meet the Article III threshold can seek to have the Court hear their
complaint against government or an executive branch official over enforcement.13 According to Scalia,
"When . . . the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue . . . there is
ordinarily little question" that he has standing. . .When, however, . . . a plaintiff's asserted injury arises
from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more
is needed."14 Otherwise, there is risk of serious interference with executive power‐‐a "transfer from the
President to the courts" of "the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.'"15 There is certainly a tendency to read the Article III barriers to
standing as posing a more formidable barrier than before Scalia joined the Court.
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In that much‐watched case from 2004, Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the
Supreme Court accepted a case in which the Ninth Circuit had held that the Establishment Clause was
violated when public school teachers led students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance containing the
phrase “one nation under God.” However, the Court reversed the decision on grounds that Newdow, a
non‐custodial parent never married to the child’s mother—lacked standing in the case. 16 A revival of
this case, with parents who overcame the Supreme Court’s barrier to standing, seems currently to
remain in process in the Ninth Circuit.17 In an interesting recent case that may eventually find its way to
the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit narrowly held that teacher plaintiffs had standing to claim an
Establishment Clause violation (some as individuals and some as municipal taxpayers) when their jobs
were eliminated as local school board outsourced special education to the Kingswood Academy, a
Christian private school.18 Facing budget cuts, the Board of Education determined that Kingswood could
replace the alternative school program at a lesser cost. Kingswood personnel would not be considered
employees of the Board, nor would the Director of Schools supervise or evaluate employees who
provided these alternative school services for children with behavioral or emotional problems. The
Kingswood School “is unique because we offer children a Christian environment of love and
encouragement.” Furthermore, “Kingswood was founded with the intent to insure that each child
placed in its care receives Christian religious training. A unique feature of the Kingswood program is the
emphasis that is placed upon instilling in each child a personal faith in God, and the assurance of the
saving grace of Jesus Christ while remaining unaffiliated with any specific denomination or Church.”19
Because the question of whether the public school students in the day program were, indeed, subjected
to Christian education was not clearly resolved, the case was remanded for further proceedings. Here, it
would appear that parents, at least, of children attending Kingswood could establish standing; it is less
clear how the current Supreme Court would treat standing for the teachers, given the split on the Sixth
Circuit on this matter.20

Approaching the issue in Hein as one of government as speaker—even when using taxpayer
money—reverberates with a trajectory of First Amendment jurisprudence that has been interesting and
controversial since at least 1991. Since Rust v. Sullivan, the Court has been deferential to government
when it advances particular viewpoints with taxpayer money. In Rust, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority on a closely divided Court, argued that
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same
16
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time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another
way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.21

Court majorities had already allowed that government funders generally enjoyed wide latitude when
choosing among competing demands for public funds. Whatever right a woman had to seek an
abortion, for example, posed no special obstacle to the exercise of this discretion. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority in Maher v. Roe in 1977, saw no implied limitation on “the authority of a State to
make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the
allocation of public funds.”22 Federal government refusal to fund programs mentioning abortion as an
acceptable method of family planning under Health and Human Services rulemaking was a perfectly
acceptable corollary, and Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Maher as an authority for this posture.23 The
government, he wrote for the Court, “has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely
chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of another.”24 While no one could get such a claim before
the Court, can I idly speculate that it is quite possible to view this approach as government expenditure
in furtherance of a religious viewpoint?
There is more mileage to be gotten out of thinking about abortion decisions in light of the
Establishment Clause. In the matter of parental consent provisions in state abortion statutes, Helena
Silverstein has recently documented how judicial bypass provisions are frequently abused by members
of the bench, who may compel minors to submit to religious counseling from pro‐life evangelicals. She
argues that judges make calculated efforts to convey their religious views and persuade minors to carry
fetuses to term.25 Does this fail as an Establishment Clause matter because the young women were
ultimately not compelled to deliver children they sought to abort? Or because their issues had become
moot if they could not obtain a judicial bypass and did not or could not obtain parental consent? While
Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore’s refusal to remove the Ten Commandments from his courtroom was
a high drama Establishment Clause issue, why are we so very much more concerned with stone tablets
and framed displays than with proselytizing by government officials or their surrogates—proselytizing to
minors, nonetheless? Because the judges may have outsourced at least some of the counseling so that
it did not take place in the courtroom, does this save the religious counseling from the same kind of
infirmity that doomed a nondenominational prayer at a high school graduation in Lee v. Weisman?26 In
the case of compelled pro‐life counseling, I would argue that government‐sponsored speech indeed
represents an establishment.
If government as funder can choose to prefer live childbirth over abortion with taxpayer dollars,
government may also choose to require the National Endowment for the Arts to take into account
“general standards of decency and respect for the diverse believes and values of the American public,”
as directed by the Helms Amendment. 27 Artists who claimed that the restrictions were a form of
21

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
23
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
24
Rust, supra note 21.
25
Helena Silverstein, Girls on the Stand: How Courts Fail Pregnant Minors. (New York: NYU Press, 2007).
26
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy. I don’t want to go too far
afield here, but are female minors seeking judicial bypass for an abortion so very different from impressionable
students who don’t want to skip their high school graduation?
27
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
22

6

viewpoint discrimination were told by Justice O’Connor and the majority that a) the language in the
Helms Amendment was merely hortatory (a position the NEA had taken as well), that b) the NEA had
limited resources, had to deny funding to many projects, and had to make judgments about artistic
worth—i.e., it made value judgments all the time; and therefore c) no one’s freedom of expression had
been curtailed since government subsidy was in no way promised or certain in any case. While I think
O’Connor’s opinion weaseled out of the hard issues in this case, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
did join the issue directly. When government acts as funder, government is permitted to express a
viewpoint.
Government, Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) argued, was permitted to establish
“content‐and viewpoint‐based criteria upon which grant applications are to be evaluated.” Government
can mandate that factors in the Hyde Amendment be considered—e.g. “disrespect for the diverse
beliefs and values of the American public or fail[ure] to comport with general standards of decency.”28
Likewise, in United States v. American Library Association, the Court held that a public library receiving
federal subsidies was not subject to unconstitutional conditions when it was required to install filtering
software that blocked internet access to obscenity, child pornography, or other indecent materials
harmful to minors. Quoting Rust, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, held that “when the
Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that
program.”29
The final nail in the argument that government need not be content or viewpoint‐neutral may
well have been delivered via Justice Scalia’s claim in Finley that “It is the very business of government to
favor and disfavor points of view on (in modern times, at least) innumerable subjects—which is the main
reason we have decided to elect those who run the government, rather than save money by making
their posts hereditary.”30 He is right at some level: governmental policies certainly do favor some
values over others and make choices among values. In that sense, governmental spending decisions are
value decisions, and if a party wins the White House and the Congress, it gets to make decisions about
directions and values. That sounds very much like the position of Oliver Wendell Holmes, who believed
that the interests that win elections generally should have their way. Holmes wrote Felix Frankfurter, “I
quite agree that a law should be called good if it reflects the will of the dominant forces of the
community even if it will take us to hell.”31 So citizens express their preferences through elections, and
elected leaders seek to implement the preferences of those who put them in Washington or in their
state capitols.32
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Former Chief Justice Rehnquist, in ALA, stated flatly that “Government entities do not have First
Amendment rights.”33 As one recent scholar notes, “the Speech Clause is typically understood as a
bulwark of protection against ‐ rather than a source of rights for ‐ government.”34 However, we see that
the Court insists that government is permitted to advance viewpoints when it speaks, and it certainly
looks as if advancing “ideas” (Kennedy’s terminology) such as the appropriate use of faith‐based
initiatives in public programs is protected against most Establishment Clause challenges. Government as
funder is also permitted to promote specific aims, and funding these aims—such as in the case of
funding conferences to encourage and funding workshops to help prepare funding proposals from faith‐
based groups‐‐seems also to be protected against most Establishment Clause challenges. Government‐
as‐speaker looms in cases from Rust onward; the Court has increasingly come to realize this category for
purposes of analysis. Of course, for some purposes, the Court considers money to be speech, as in the
line of cases concerning campaign expenditures from Buckley through Randall v. Sorrell. 35 Justice
Kennedy has been particularly vocal in arguing that campaign contributions are also core political
speech, insisting upon the abolition of the distinction between contributions and expenditures.36 Even
though government entities don’t have First Amendment rights, I would contend that the Court is
behaving as if they do as they close off avenues through which citizens can challenge government taxing
and spending in support of religion.
While government may be able to express its viewpoint with money, government cannot simply
say whatever it likes. It cannot simply endorse a particular religion, for example. It cannot, apparently,
endorse religion in general, although I would argue that practice makes this less clear. When
government funds faith‐based initiatives, is government the speaker?37 That is, when government funds
actors and organizations in the “private” sector to perform tasks and services that government might
have undertaken itself‐‐whether it be running prisons, schools, contracting operations in Iraq, or
provision of community social services—what constitutional standards govern the expressive activities
(and indeed, actions) of these entities? Are they governmental actors or merely private ones, or
something in between?38 The concept of government speech is a relatively recent one; one of its recent
manifestations came in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association in 2005.39
Recent Court decisions on Establishment contribute to the current problem we are having with
Establishment. It appears that government need only be neutral in its funding; if it does not exclude
religious organizations when it funds programs with a valid secular purpose, and if no one is
indoctrinated more than they would have been if government aid were not present, there is no
Establishment Clause problem.40
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The trajectory of First Amendment speech jurisprudence seems to silence the kinds of
Establishment Clause challenges posed by the activities of the White House Office of Faith‐Based and
Community Initiatives. If taxpayers ultimately are barred from standing to challenge alleged
Establishment Clause violations caused by government taxing and spending to support religion, don’t
the interests and prerogatives of government‐as‐speaker or government‐as‐funder ultimately trump
the “ideological” or “psychological” injuries of disgruntled citizens? Isn’t this a strange way to ask the
Establishment Clause question?

areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any
particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government.” Justice O’Connor claimed the
Thomas opinion was one of unprecedented breadth and that it ignored the difference between direct and indirect
aid.

